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Innocence, Negligence, and
Common Sense: Tort Liability
of Mentally Impaired Persons
Recent case law has dictated changes in
the treatment of tort cases involving
mentally impaired citizens. This study
illuminates the developing exceptions
to liability with regard to properly
trained professional caregivers.
By William P. Donaldson
It is not, what a lawyer tells me I may do; but what
humanity, reason, and justice tell me I ought to do.'
Edmund Burke (1729-1797)
Philosopher, Political Scientist;
Member of British Parliament
n the late nineteenth century, some 35 or so
years after Wisconsin statehood, Justice
Cassoday of the state supreme court wrote
the opinion in a rather ordinary fire insurance
case that has become a focal point for later
discussions of tort liability of the "insane." 2 In
Karow v. Continental Ins., Justice Cassoday appar-
ently referred to English common-law tradition and
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a case already two centuries old at the time that
declared that "insane persons" are generally liable
for injuries caused by their inability to control or
understand the consequences of their actions. In
applying that principle, the court declared that
"where a loss must be borne by one of two inno-
cent parties, it should be borne by him who occa-
sioned it."4 This decision, as subsequently modi-
fied, forms the root of the issue decided by the case
that is the topic of this article.
To generalize, the issue discussed here is
whether or not a person under a mental disability
who is receiving professional services from a health
care provider is liable to that provider for injuries
that the provider suffers as a result of the recipient's
negligent actions. A defining moment in the con-
sideration of this question came with the decision
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Gould v.
American Family Insurance.s The ruling in that
case is limited by the facts to a situation where the
interaction between the provider and the patient is
one of a strictly professional nature occurring in a
controlled environment during the course of pre-
scribed treatment. Consideration is also due the
interaction between the civil action brought by the
plaintiff caregiver and the worker's compensation
laws of the state.
The title of this case frames the issue as primar-
ily one of insurer concern, but the facts and the
analysis demonstrate that the outcome of the con-
troversy has much broader implications for persons
afflicted with dementia such as Alzheimer's dis-
ease.6 The gentleman who was the original defen-
dant in the suit, Mr. Moniken, had a well-docu-
mented history of Alzheimer's and was placed in
the particular nursing facility because it had a unit
expressly designed to care for residents with this
affliction. Mr. Moniken was strategically dropped
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from the litigation before the first trial, and the
proceedings were completed with American Family
Insurance, the issuer of Mr. Moniken's homeown-
er's policy as the sole defendant. As later became
apparent, American Family had a somewhat differ-
ent interest in the outcome than did the advocates
for patients with dementia who were very much
involved in the appeals as amici curiae.
The factual history was relatively straightfor-
ward. Plaintiff Gould was head nurse of the unit
for the nursing facility that was intended and
designed to house and care for residents with
dementia. She had been an employee (in varying,
progressively more responsible positions) of that
unit for an extended period of time dating from
before she had entered and completed nursing
school. At the time of the incident, she was respon-
sible for, among other duties, training and supervi-
sion of professional and nonprofessional staff who
would provide care to the residents of the unit. She
is, by all accounts, a highly competent and quali-
fied nurse who understood the particular difficul-
ties that may be encountered in this type of unit.
On the day of the incident, Nurse Gould found
that Mr. Moniken had wandered into another resi-
dent's room and she was attempting to redirect him
back to his own. Despite her admitted foreknowl-
edge of Mr. Moniken's history of angry outbursts
and her understanding of the possibility of physical
reaction by Alzheimer's patients, she approached
Mr. Moniken with a medication tray in one hand
and gently tried to direct him with her free hand on
his arm. What exactly happened next is unclear,
but it is documented that Nurse Gould was, in
some way, struck by Mr. Moniken and severely
injured.
Ms. Gould was awarded a worker's compensa-
tion settlement as a result of this injury and was,
therefore, precluded from pursuing any further
claim against her employer.' She was not, however,
prevented from seeking damages directly from Mr.
Moniken and his insurer. Based on the theory of
"insane person liability" noted above, she brought
this action.
In 1883, Karow described the principle of
"insane person" liability stating that, where both
parties to the incident are "innocent," the person
who acted to cause the injury is liable.' One might
wonder how the actor who causes the injury can be
"innocent." The word is used, in this context, not
as an opposite of guilt, but in the sense of being
unaware of the circumstances, dangers, or possible
outcome of a given situation. The factual basis
described in Karow shows that, in cases of insani-
ty, the insane party is unaware of the wrongness or
the consequences of her or his actions and is, there-
fore, considered innocent. In that context, the
injured party in Karow was also "innocent" in that
the person was unfamiliar with the actor and had
no forewarning of the danger he presented. Thus,
there were two innocent parties, one of whom
caused substantial injury to the other. The Karow
court held that where an insane person harmed
another, liability would be imposed not on the
basis of the actor's breach of any duty, but rather
on a fairness principle.
In 1935, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, In re
Meyer's Guardianship," built on the principle out-
lined in Karow and expanded the concept to
include two more considerations. In addition to the
idea that the actor should be liable when both par-
ties are innocent, the Meyer court held that the
imposition of liability would be warranted as a
means to encourage families to exert a sufficient
amount of control over the insane person to assure
the public safety. The imposition of liability would,
further, prevent feigned insanity as a means of
avoiding responsibility. This decision stated the
general rule that is applied today as evidenced in
Wisconsin's Civil Jury Instruction #1021.
In the 1970 decision in Breunig v. American
Family Ins. Co., the court acknowledged an excep-
tion to the general rule for situations where the
onset of "insanity" is completely unanticipated and
without forewarning." Here, the driver of an auto-
mobile suddenly became convinced that a divine
entity was controlling her actions (and those of the
car) and she was involved in a serious accident.
Because there had been no history of mental aber-
rations that might have foreshadowed this event,
the court ruled that the general rule of liability was
inapt and that it would not apply where the person
is suddenly overcome without forewarning by a
mental disability or disorder that incapacitates him
from conforming his conduct to the standards of a
reasonable man. The court likened the circum-
stance in Breunig to a situation where a driver suf-
fers an unexpected heart attack, stroke, or epileptic
seizure.12
A somewhat similar case was decided contem-
poraneously with Gould. The court, in Burch v.
American Family Ins. Co.," found no liability
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where an unfortunate fact pattern in which the
tortfeasor's father was the caregiver-victim did not
fit into the exceptions described in either Breunig
or Gould. In Burch, the caregiver left his mentally
disabled adolescent daughter in the cab of a truck
with the keys in the ignition while he walked
behind the vehicle. The child started the engine,
and the vehicle lurched backward, injuring the
father. Without specifically declaring as much, it
appears the court found the father was not "inno-
cent" of the dangers posed by his actions relative to
his child's condition. The jury found that the
father's negligence was the sole cause of the acci-
dent and refused to find liability on her part or of
the insurer.
In a case with remarkably similar facts, the
Florida Supreme Court held in Anicet v. Gant that
a caregiver's understanding and experience in deal-
ing with potentially dangerous patients created a
buffer to negligence claims made against "insane"
patients. 4 In that case, the Florida court held that
the differences between the instant facts and the
precedential case that formed the basis for that
state's rule of "insane person" liability in negli-
gence actions were sufficient to warrant an excep-
tion based on public policy.
Often cited, but readily distinguishable from
this situation, is the 1935 case of McGuire v.
Almy.'s There, the caregiver was injured while on
duty as an in-home nurse without special training
in mental diseases. Further, the claim made in that
case was for an intentional tort of assault and bat-
tery. The opinion does not state how the court
would have ruled if negligence had been the claim,
but the court does conclude that, under these cir-
cumstances, the intent of the actor was to strike the
victim. She did act on that intent, thus justifying a
jury finding of guilt on the claim of intentional
assault.
Ms. Gould's case was tried before a St. Croix
County Circuit Court jury and decided in
September of 1993. Shortly before the trial began,
Mr. Moniken was dropped as a defendant in the
case, apparently for strategic reasons. The judge
gave the case to the jury with a standard instruc-
tion as specified in Wisconsin's Civil jury
Instruction #1021. That instruction states that
it is the law that a person who is mentally ill is held to
the same standard of care as one who has normal
mentality, and in your determination of the question
of negligence, you will give no consideration to the
defendant's mental condition.
The jury returned a finding in favor of Ms. Gould
and an appeal to the court of appeals was taken.
The court of appeals 6 overturned the trial
court's result and surprisingly found a nearly uni-
versal exception to liability for insane tortfeasors.
In nearly complete opposition to the earlier prece-
dents, the court held that, under Breunig, it is
"unjust to hold a man responsible for his conduct
which he is incapable of avoiding and which inca-
pability was unknown to him prior to the acci-
dent."" The court of appeals here reasoned that the
Breunig decision is incompatible with the rationale
and standards of Meyer and thus, found that a per-
son with a "permanent mental disorder" cannot be
liable in negligence. The decision was satisfactory
to neither side, and both parties appealed to the
state supreme court.
At the supreme court, Plaintiff Gould argued to
reinstate the Meyer standards, which would allow
a finding of liability against Mr. Moniken's insurer,
and Defendant American Family sought to have the
trial court's decision overturned according to the
principle outlined by the court of appeals without
further modification or proceedings.
Gould asserted that a "permanent mental dis-
ability" exception is unreasonable as a public poli-
cy and not a proper defense to negligence. The
plaintiff further claimed that this ruling would lead
to windfalls for insurers who could collect premi-
ums from mentally disabled persons and deny
claims against them on the basis of that disability.
Finally, the plaintiff argued that the protections of
worker's compensation were inadequate in this
context and were not meant to insulate third-party
tortfeasors from liability for accidents that happen
on the job.
The defense argued that the principles of the
Breunig decision are apt and that tort liability
requires some degree of fault. The defense also
pointed out that new information and understand-
ing of mental illness, and new public concern for
the plight of families dealing with loved ones
afflicted with Alzheimer's disease and similar con-
ditions, requires a revisiting of the rationale behind
the current public policy.
Additionally, there were briefs amicus curiae
filed by the Board on Aging and Long Term Care
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of Wisconsin (BOALTC), the Coalition of
Wisconsin Aging Groups (CWAG), and the
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP).
These briefs raised and detailed several considera-
tions apart from those contained in the briefs of the
parties. In a joint brief, BOALTC and CWAG
focused their comments on the primary issue of this
case's differences from the situation addressed by
the Meyer ruling. Additionally, BOALTC and
CWAG discussed the problem of decreased avail-
ability of meaningful insurance for Alzheimer's
patients if the court of appeals decision remained
intact. AARP, on the other hand, argued for appli-
cation of a "subjective" standard of care compar-
ing the actor's actions to those of a "reasonable
man with a like disability." Reasoning that
Alzheimer's is a physical disease, not unlike cardio-
vascular disease causing stroke or heart attack,
AARP sought to have the court adopt a situational
determination of responsibility.
At oral argument, the court seemed very inter-
ested in defining and determining the role of fore-
knowledge and experience in the conduct of daily
activities of this kind of care unit. As an observer, I
had the sense that the court was seeking a way to
do, as Mr. Burke suggested, "what humanity, rea-
son, and justice tell [us that we] ought to do.""
The supreme court's ruling was handed down
on January 30, 1996. In a thoughtfully crafted
opinion, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley held that there
ought to be a narrowly circumscribed exception to
the general rule where an "insane" person negli-
gently harms a paid professional caregiver.
In sum, we agree with the Goulds that ordinarily a
mentally disabled person is responsible for his or her
torts. However, we conclude that this rule does not
apply in this case because the circumstances totally
negate the rationale behind the rule and would place
an unreasonable burden on the negligent institutional-
ized mentally disabled. When a mentally disabled per-
son injures an employed caretaker, the injured party
can reasonably foresee the danger and is not "inno-
cent" of the risk involved. By placing a mentally dis-
abled person in an institution or similar restrictive set-
ting, "those interested in the estate" of that person are
not likely to be in need of an inducement for greater
restraint. It is incredible to assert that a tortfeasor
would "simulate or pretend insanity" over a pro-
longed period of time and even be institutionalized in
order to avoid being held liable for damages for some
future civil act. Therefore, we hold that a person insti-
tutionalized, as here, with a mental disability, and who
does not have the capacity to control or appreciate his
or her conduct cannot be held liable for injuries
caused to caretakers who are employed for financial
compensation."
From the perspective of an advocate for the
rights of elderly residents of nursing homes, group
homes, and other residential care settings, this rul-
ing represents a significant benchmark establishing
just treatment of unfortunate incidents involving
persons with dementia. It further underscores the
importance to caregiving organizations of main-
taining effective training and procedures to safe-
guard the interests of both residents and staff.
Had this ruling reversed the court of appeals
decision and returned the case to the original trial
court outcome, insurers would have been faced
with circumstances strongly suggesting that per-
sons with dementia represent too great a risk to
qualify for ordinary insurance. Had the supreme
court upheld the court of appeals, insurers would
have been effectively insulated from any claims for
injuries resulting from the negligence of an "insane
person" and yet been allowed to continue collect-
ing premiums for their clients' insurance policies.
This case was originally brought as a claim against
Mr. Moniken's homeowner's policy. Despite the
fact that he was not residing in the home at the
time of the event, he was still listed as a primary
owner and the insurance was held in his name.
Had the trial court's rulling been upheld, it could
very easily have had the effect of making it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for persons with dementia
to obtain homeowner's insurance. This would then
require families to isolate their loved ones, sym-
bolically if not actually, by stripping them of the
ownership of the family estate, which the person
had, in all likelihood, worked to secure over the
course of a lifetime. This indignity would be
another added to the many already suffered by
Alzheimer's victims. The Appeals Court ruling, if
left intact, would have opened a door for insurers
to potentially realize a financial windfall by per-
mitting issuance of policies that would not be sub-
ject to any claim where the insured's actions were
a result of dementia. In crafting this decision,
Judge Bradley effectively drew a separation
between these unattractive results and created an
exception that addresses this unfortunate situa-
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tion. The changing epidemiology of dementia
makes this issue a potentially much more fre-
quently encountered problem.
Less than a year after the decision in Gould, a
California appeals court cited the case as informa-
tive in its decision in Herrle v. Marshall.0 The facts
in Herrle are similar to Gould, but the defense
raised by the defendant is one of "primary assump-
tion of risk.""1 Defining primary assumption of risk
as a situation where the defendant does not owe a
duty of care to the plaintiff, the California court
found the only duty of care was in the other direc-
tion from plaintiff to defendant. California has
codified the common-law doctrine of "insane per-
son liability,"22 and the caregiver-plaintiff in Herrle
relied on that statute as a means to attribute liabil-
ity to the defendant. The court found, however,
that Civil Code Section 41 applies in situations
where the "person of unsound mind" has a duty of
care. "Where no duty exists, section 41 does not
create one."23 Because of the relationship between
the two parties, the court ruled that there was no
duty on the part of the patient toward the caregiv-
er. In a lengthy analysis of the Wisconsin decision,
the California court found Justice Bradley's reason-
ing persuasive that the relationship between an
"Alzheimer's patient and his employed caretaker
justifies exonerating the patient from the usual
duty of care." 24
An Indiana court, in Creasy v. Rusk,25 consid-
ered the issues raised by Gould and determined
that "the public policy implications of imposing a
duty [of care] on an institutionalized mentally dis-
abled patient are dependent upon the degree of the
patient's incapacity." 2 6 This would seem to require
a fact finder's determination of the "degree of inca-
pacity" in each case, thus setting the stage for a
"battle of experts" on the issue.
A very recent Wisconsin case, Jankee v. Clark
County,27 finds the court of appeals applying Gould
in a contributory negligence case rather than in the
"insane person liability" context in which it was
originally decided. Here, the plaintiff claimed that
the injuries that he sustained as a result of attempt-
ing to escape from the mental institution in which
he was appropriately confined were the result of
the facility's negligent supervision of his person.
The nursing home, a county facility, countered that
Mr. Jankee was contributorily negligent in causing
his own injuries by falling from a second story win-
dow while trying to escape. Using the public policy
analysis set forth in Gould, the judges determined
that the plaintiff was within the exception outlined
in that case. 28 The opinion further concludes that
Gould "supports a bar to contributory negligence
when a person institutionalized with a mental ill-
ness or mental disability who does not have the
capacity to control or appreciate his or her conduct
because of that illness or disability claims that the
institution or its employees were negligent." 29
Gould and the related cases represent an
advance in the judicial treatment of mentally dis-
abled citizens. It has long been recognized that loss
of mental capacity is not sufficient reason to strip a
person of basic rights. 0 The justices in In re The
Matter of Guardianship of L. W completed a thor-
ough analysis of the precedents leading to the con-
clusion that a person in a persistent vegetative state
remains possessed of the fundamental right to
determine what is done to his body. Is it less of a
fundamental right to be free from liability for
actions that injure the person who was paid,
trained, and responsible to prevent those very same
actions by a mentally disabled patient?
Alzheimer's disease and related conditions sap
the very essence of the individual. Memories disap-
pear. Frustration and rage are frequently the
replacements. In the mind of a formerly calm and
loving father or mother, a new and frightening per-
sonality may appear. Families, when trying to cope
with these changes, are forced at some point to
seek professional help in some degree. The prospect
that the professional consulted will one day be able
to assert a liability claim arising out of the condi-
tion they are supposed to alleviate may be enough
to cause families to delay seeking treatment. This is
not the effect that the law should have. The law
should help to protect and preserve the rights of the
most vulnerable among us. Nurse Gould was
injured, no doubt. She was duly compensated to
the extent of the worker's compensation laws. If
she had been unprepared for Mr. Moniken's
actions, if she were not an expert in the nursing
care and treatment of Alzheimer's patients, if she
were not employed explicitly for providing such
care and treatment, the general rule of "insane per-
son liability" would apply. But, when we apply the
law, we must, as Mr. Burke said, apply it with
"humanity, reason, and justice" in order to prevent
the diminution of our society by the systemic
diminution of the rights of the mentally disabled. In
creating the professional caregiver exception to the
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general rule of insane person liability, the Gould
court displayed remarkable humanity, reason, and
justice.
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